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LABOUR PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE NETHERLANDS; 
Reconstructing the welfare state 
 
 






Generous social security is regarded as a major source of low labour participation in The 
Netherlands. The rise in the demand for social security benefits has led to an increase in the wedge - 
the difference between gross labour costs and net wages -. This has, both at the demand side and the 
supply side, further discouraged labour participation, which again resulted in higher demand for 
social security. Our paper discusses this negative spiral using a simulation model which quantifies the 
major relationships with respect to labour participation and social security in a consistent way. Firstly, 
in a cliometric simulation, we show how economic developments in The Netherlands would have 
looked like if the demand for social security (more specifically the amount paid for social security 
benefits) would not have increased relative to national income in the last two decades. Secondly, a 
number of scenarios shows how the welfare state can be reconstructed by restricting the demand for 
social security, and hence how the negative spiral of labour participation and social security can be 




An extended and generous social security system is often associated with a highly developed welfare 
state. From that point of view The Netherlands should be regarded as such. However, the costs of 
maintaining the system of social security in The Netherlands have become extremely high and 
labour participation has strongly decreased, so that welfare is at stake just because of the generous 
social security system. The present level of social security may no longer reflect policy preferences, 
nor does it necessarily reflect past preferences since in the design of the social security system no 
such high costs were anticipated. Therefore, the political views on welfare and social security have 
shifted recently in The Netherlands. The crucial policy question in this respect is about the role and 
prospects of the government in enhancing social welfare. More specifically the question is what 
services the government should provide in order to promote social welfare and to what extent, for 
instance, the provision of social insurance should be left to the private sector. 
 
Against this background the present paper provides a quantitative analysis of the mutual relation-
ships between the demand for social security, labour participation and economic activity. After a 
short historical overview of economic thinking about these relationships in The Netherlands in the 
next section, Section 3 presents an allocation model for labour participation that quantifies the 
relationships which are at the middle of the present policy discussions on the changing role of social 
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security in the (re)construction of the welfare state. Section 4 provides policy simulations using this 
model. Section 5 evaluates these policies and gives some conclusions. 
 
2. Social security in The Netherlands  
 
The building up of the system of social security in The Netherlands mainly took place in the 1950's 
and 1960's. New elements were added to the existing system so that this period can be labelled as the 
construction period of social security. On the other hand the period from 1970 onwards can be 
labelled the consolidation period, in which the system was not expanded with major new provisions. 
However, during this period the demand for social security increased dramatically because of a 
sharp rise in a number of persons who were (or made themselves) entitled for benefits. The 
consequent mechanism is sometimes referred to as the social security trap (see Van Praag and Van 
Beek, 1991). According to this mechanism, the demand for social security is trapped into a negative 
spiral and diverges further and further from equilibrium. The model of the next section makes this 
negative spiral explicit by describing the relationships  between social security, the labour market 
and economic activity. 
 
The extension of the social security system and the consequent growth of demand for social security 
contributed considerably to the extension of the public sector in The Netherlands. The economic 
policy debate of the last decades has focused on this aspect. Kessler (1979, 1981) put much effort in 
providing a correct statistical definition for a broadly defined public sector and, hence, for its 
counterpart the market sector. Table 1 gives the breakdown of the number of people receiving 
income from the public sector and from the market sector according to Kessler's analysis. The 
discussion focused not only on the share of public expenditure in national income, but also on the 
number of people obtaining income from the public sector as a percentage of those having their 
income from the market sector. The table shows that both percentages have considerably increased 
until the second half of the 1980's. 
 
The economic policy debate of today mainly focuses on the low labour participation of which the 
affluent social security is considered as a main cause. The statistic indicating the ratio between the 
number of people receiving benefits and the number of active workers is at the core of the 
discussion. Table 1 shows this statistic for the reference period as well. It demonstrates that at 
present each active worker in The Netherlands almost completely supports another person who is 
entitled to a benefit, whereas in 1970 a person entitled to a benefit had his or her support payed by 
two active workers
1
. Some may argue that the present situation in The Netherlands, where each 
person supports another person, is optimal from a social welfare point of view. To the economist it 
is, however, clear that the 'productive basis' of the country has become rather small. 
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    1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 
1 Active persons in the public sectora   
  a Government and social funds  542 598 668 697 691 688 683 
  b Semi-public sector  201 300 337 369 392 400 413 
    ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Total    743 898 1005 1066 1083 1088 1096 
 
2 Inactive persons in the public sector with 
  benefits in virtue of 
  a Old Age Pensions/Widows and Orphans Act (AOW and AWW) 1502 1681 1853 1962 2145 2171 2195 
  b Occupational disability (WAO)   188  299  502  585  682  697  715 
  c Temporary illness    229  302  325  267  354  358  331 
  d Unemployment     82  201  237  613  498  482  502 
  e Early retirement (VUT)      0    0    8   35   70   70    70 
  f Public assistance (incl. artists arrangement etc.)    79  114  127  185  175  176  176 
    ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Total (a - f)   2080 2597 3052 3647 3924 3954 3989 
 
3 Earners in the public sector (1+2)  2823 3495 4057 4713 5007 5042 5085 
 
4 Earners in the private sectora  3720 3474 3473 3264 3590 3627 3641 
 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage  
of earners in the private sector (3/4)   75.9 100.6 116.8 144.4 139.5 139.0 139.7 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons (2/(1+4))    46.6  59.4  68.2  84.2  84.0  83.9  84.2 
 
Government expenditure as a percentage of national   33.0  41.3  47.1  46.2  50.5  52.0  51.9 
income 
Size of the wedge (as a percentage of gross wage costs)   39.2  47.5  51.3  54.5  60.4  60.8  61.1 
  
 
a Exclusive of temporary illness. 
Source:De Nederlandsche Bank; last two lines: sources mentioned in appendix. 
 
The last lines of table 1 contain data on the share of public expenditure in national income and the 
size of the wedge (gross wage costs minus net wage income as a percentage of gross earned wages). 
According to both statistics the relative size of the public sector appears to have increased with 




The presentation of the data in table 1 forms the starting point for the model based analysis of social 
security which is discussed in the next two sections. The current simulation model exploits quantitati-
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ve research of others on the relationship between social security and the rest of the economy. In this 
respect we mention Den Butter and Compaijen (1991), and Vijlbrief (1992) who studied the 
relationship between social security and the labour market using small aggregated equilibrium and 
disequilibrium models. Whether the labour market clears or not appears to have a major influence 
on the effects of social security on the labour market. According to the equilibrium model a 
reduction of the benefit to wage ratio (the 'replacement ratio') has a much larger effect on employ-
ment and economic activity than in the case the economy is modelled to be in disequilibrium. 
However, our present model does not explicitly consider the problem of market-clearing but 
intermediates between these two stands by including determinants of both labour demand and 
labour supply into the allocation mechanism. As mentioned before, the focus of the model is on the 
relationship between social security and labour participation, which is only casually looked at in 
other models of social security. 
 
3.  An allocation model for labour participation 
 
Figure 1 pictures the relationship between labour participation, social security and the government in 
our model. The figure shows a breakdown of the total working age population into three categories, 
namely the active workers (participants), non-participants receiving a benefit, and finally 
non-participants who do not receive a benefit. The figure visualizes the total working age population 
as a basin with movable bulkheads in between the three categories distinguished. The upper part of 
the figure shows the mechanisms which sets these bulkheads into motion. It illustrates how changes 
in the allocation of the total working age population over the three categories can take place. The 
total working age population is exogenous as it is determined by demographic factors. Movements of 
the bulkheads within the three categories indicate to what extent labour participation (defined in this 
context as the ratio of active workers to the total working age population) is subject to change and 
how changes in the ratio of active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit take place. 
 
The mechanisms which set the bulkheads into motion relate to the working of the labour market. 
Labour participation is determined both by labour demand and by labour supply. First we look at 
labour demand. Economic activity constitutes the major determinant of labour demand. When 
economic activity increases the bulkhead between the active workers and non-participants moves to 
the right and, hence, the part of the basin consisting of active workers becomes larger. Conceivably, 
the bulkhead between non-participants with and without entitlement to benefits will also move to the 
right. In order to keep the figure simple, the latter movement is not portrayed. Gross wage costs 
constitute the second major determinant of labour demand. A rise of gross labour costs will, ceteris 
paribus, lead to a decrease of labour demand. Hence the bulkhead between active workers and 














Now we come to labour supply. Here net wages act as determinant. A rise in net wages leads to an 
increase in labour supply, so that the bulkhead between the active workers and the non-participants 
will move to the right. On the other hand, a fall in net wages, for instance because of an increase in 
the incidence of taxes and social security premiums, brings about a fall in labour supply and in 
labour participation. 
 
The government disposes of some instruments in the field of social security which directly affect 
labour supply. Government instruments are depicted in the figure by means of diamonds, whereas 
variables in squares are either autonomous or endogenous. The first instrument of social security 
which influences the allocation of the working age population is the relative benefit level, or more 
specifically the ratio between net benefits and wages (the 'replacement ratio'). A higher replacement 
ratio induces more people to seek entitlement for a benefit and effective labour supply will decrease. 
Thus, the ratio between active workers and non-participants receiving benefits will come down and 
so does total labour participation. A rise of the benefit wage ratio therefore causes the bulkheads in 
the figure to move to the left. 
 
The second instrument of the government which influences labour participation, has been labelled 
here, rather vaguely, as social climate. A first aspect with regard to this determinant in the allocation 
model is the well known moral hazard problem with social security. Lubbers (1990) describes a 
decay of the social climate as the erosion of the sense of responsibility when applying for social 
security. On the other hand, social climate comprises the fact that people will become aware of their 
legal right to demand social security in case they have become eligible
3
. For that reason we use the 
wording of social climate which does not contain a value judgement. One could also speak of a kind 
of 'rent seeking', which is yet another aspect of the social climate variable. When, in our terminology, 
social climate decreases the bulkheads in the basin move to the left. Then the ratio of active workers 
and non-participants decreases. On the other hand, an increase in social climate, induces, as the 
figure shows, the bulkheads to move to the right. Whereas the benefit level as an instrument of the 
government represents so-called price policies in social security, the possibility of the government to 
influence social acceptance or the social climate can be regarded as examples of volume policies. An 
increase in the social climate can be brought about by strengthening the standards of eligibility for 
social security. Another way to effectuate a higher social climate is to call for the responsibility of the 
people not to abuse social security, and to provide training and the opportunity to obtain working 
experience rather than just giving financial compensation ('workfare' instead of 'welfare'). In The 
Netherlands this kind of policy is part of the so-called 'social renewal'. Obviously the outcome of 
such policy is very uncertain and difficult to quantify.  
 
Changes in labour participation bring about feedback mechanisms which are of importance in the 
present context. When more people become active in the production process economic activity will 
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increase, not only because of the input of productive capacity which remains idle in the case of 
non-participation, but also because the employment of this productive capacity enlarges human 
capital by learning by doing, while on the other hand human capital depreciates when it remains 
unused (see Bastianen et al., 1993 for the distinction between primary and secondary social costs in 
case of non-participation). Consequently, the enhanced economic activity induces higher tax receipts 
of the government. On the other hand, a rise in the number of non-participants receiving social 
security benefits leads to an increase in government expenditure. The size of this increase depends, 
among other things, on the benefit level.  
 
The government budget confronts government expenditure with income from taxes and social 
security premiums. When expenditures rise, for instance because of an increase in the number of 
people receiving benefits, higher expenditures can be financed in two ways, namely by enlarging the 
government deficit or by an increase in the wedge between gross wage costs and net wages. An 
increase in the government deficit, indicated in the figure by a diamond as a possible instrument of 
government policy, is not feasible in the present economic and political situation in The Nether-
lands. That is why a rise in the demand for social security nowadays almost automatically implies that 
the wedge between net wages and gross wage costs becomes larger. Moreover, this endogeneity of 
the wedge is also institutionally determined as social funds are financed on a balanced budget basis. 
Figure 1 clearly illustrates this central and crucial role of the wedge and the respective mechanism 
which determines labour participation and the demand for social security. A rise in the wedge leads 
to labour market discouragement, because both labour demand and labour supply decrease. Hence, 
the number of non-participants rises. This sets in motion a new part of the spiral of higher 
government expenditure and a larger wedge. 
 
The figure also points out another negative spiral: because of the decrease of the productive capacity 
in case of low labour participation economic activity falls, so that the government's income from 
taxes and social security premiums decreases, inducing the wedge to rise still further.  
 
A reversal of these two negative spirals is essential for the future of the Dutch welfare state. The 
diamonds of the figure symbolize the instruments of the government by means of which it can 
effectuate such a reversal. Of course, another effective instrument which has been extensively used in 
The Netherlands during the eighties is that of a wage restraint. A wage restraint can contribute to the 
reversal of the spiral, especially when the benefit level is linked to the wage level.  
 
The simulation model is centred around the allocation model which describes the breakdown of the 
total working age population, determined by demographic factors, into the three categories which we 
distinguish. This allocation model is reminiscent of a portfolio model according to which financial 
wealth is allocated to various assets. 
 
We now explain the equations of the model (see Annex). Equations (1) and (2) describe the size of 
the working age population and the number of people receiving benefits from old age (AOW) and 
widows and orphans pensions (AWW). Both dependent variables are determined by demographic 
factors. 
 





categories is total working age population minus civil servants and workers in the so-called 
semi-public sector (eq. 3). Thus, we assume that employment in the public sector is autonomously 
determined by the government and does not influence labour participation of the rest of the working 
age population.  
 





Figure 2 illustrates the development of the shares described by the allocation model. The figure 
comprises both past developments and an extrapolation up to 1996 using the simulation model. 
This extrapolation is based on plausible values for the exogenous variables of the model. The figure 
pictures the opposite developments of the share of active workers in the market sector and of 
non-participants receiving a benefit. The share of non-participants not receiving a benefit did 
increase somewhat in the 1970's, but in the 1980's  this share has decreased.  
 
The first determinant of the allocation model relates to labour demand, which is mainly determined 
by economic activity corrected for the trend of labour productivity (labour saving technical progress). 
Contractual working time is also relevant in this respect (eq. 7). An increase in employment, due to 
this labour demand variable, leads to a larger share of active workers in the market sector and, 






in productivity, act as second determinant of labour demand and have an opposite effect. A rise in 
wage costs induces labour demand to fall and the share of non-participants to rise.  
 
The wedge is the third determinant of the allocation model and relates to labour supply. An increase 
in the wedge is associated with the discouragement of labour supply and, hence, with an increase in 
non-participation, so that both the share of the non-participants receiving a benefit and that of those 
who do not receive a benefit increases. The wage benefit ratio or replacement ratio is the fourth 
determinant. A rise in the benefit level also leads to less labour supply. In this case, substitution 
within the allocation model mainly takes place between active workers and non-participants receiving 
a benefit. A regress of social climate, the fifth determinant of the allocation model, also leads to an 
increase in the share of non-participants receiving a benefit. Finally, for technical reasons, we have 
included labour participation of women as a determinant of the allocation. An increase of female 
labour participation (which, by the way, is rather low in The Netherlands as compared to other 
Western industrialised countries) leads to a higher share of both the active workers and non-partici-
pants receiving a benefit. Equations (9) and (10) describe technical relationships between the wedge, 
gross wage costs and net wages. Equation (11) defines the replacement ratio. The model considers 
both the salaries of civil servants and the level of benefits (both to non-participants who belong to the 
working age population and to old age pensioners) as an autonomous instrument of the government. 
 
The next set of equations of the model describes the government budget. Equations (12), (13) and 
(14) determine government expenditures, namely for salaries and for the payment of benefits. 
Equation (15) is a technical equation for indirect taxes. Equation (16) calculates desired government 
income from direct taxes and social security premiums as a residual of the budget restriction. The 
model assumes that government expenditure, given indirect taxes and the size of the government 
deficit, is completely financed out of taxes and social security premiums. This determines the size of 
the wedge (equation 17). Equations (18) and (19) are related definitions of the wedge which are used 
elsewhere in the model. 
 
Finally, equations (20) and (21) describe, in a very broad manner, the positive effect of an increase in 
labour participation at the goods market. Until now, not much empirical work has been done on 
measuring welfare gains from enhanced labour participation empirically (see Bastianen et al., 1993), 
so that our modelling of this effect is, by necessity, somewhat surmised. Equation (20) describes 
actual income as the combined result of demand at the goods market when the participation rate 
were at average (which is exogenous to the model), and the labour participation effect. 
 
The model highly simplifies the actual social security system of The Netherlands as it adds together 
different social security provisions (disability, sickness, unemployment, early retirement and social 
assistance). Thus, the benefit level is calculated as the average level of benefits under these provi-
sions. No simulations can be made on the dynamics of the allocation within these various provisions. 
Therefore, a possible extension of the model would be to add a second allocation model which 
describes the desaggregation of the non-participants receiving a benefit to the various provisions of 
social security. This is of importance in the context of actual policy discussions in The Netherlands, 
because a number of recipients of benefits under the disablement act should in fact be regarded as 









In order to complete the simulation model we need realistic values for the parameters of the model, 
which represent economic behaviour. Our selected parameter values for the allocation model are 
only partly based upon own empirical research. They mainly reproduce results from the literature. 
In this way, we conform ourselves as much as possible to the existing stock of empirical knowledge. 
However, the description of labour participation by means of an allocation model is a novelty of our 
approach and, therefore, we are bound to make a number of assumptions on the distribution of the 
effects over the three categories we distinguish. 
 
The simulation model uses annual data from the reference period 1970-1988. Firstly, the allocation 
model assumes that the actual shares of the three distinguished categories of the total (corrected) 
working age population adapt to their desired shares according to a partial adjustment with a mean 
lag of one year.    
 
Next we have selected parameter values for the determinants with respect to labour demand. We 
assume that on the long term a one percent increase in economic activity (corrected for labour 
productivity and working hours) leads to an equal increase of one percent in the number of active 
workers in the market sector. Hence, the long term elasticity is set to unity. This increase in the 
number of active workers is supposed to stem from both other categories proportionally. 
 
The long run labour demand elasticity of labour costs is set equal to -0.5 (see Den Butter, 1993a, for 
a survey of empirical evidence for The Netherlands). Again the assumption is made of a 
proportional distribution over both other categories. 
 
Empirical studies of the influence of the wedge, or net wages, on labour supply indicate a long term 
elasticity of 0.2 (see e.g. Theeuwes, 1988). The parameter value of the wedge in the first equation of 
the allocation model is set in accordance to this elasticity. Here the wedge is defined as the burden of 
taxes and premiums for workers (the burden for employers is included in the labour costs). Again a 
proportional distribution over both other categories is assumed. 
 
We assume that the long run labour supply elasticity of the benefit wage ratio is rather small, namely 
-0.2. We have modelled the influence of the replacement ratio in the allocation model in such a 
manner that a rise in this ratio only induces a shift in the shares of active workers and 
non-participants receiving a benefit. We do so because there is no evidence on a possible influence 
of changes in the replacement ratio on the allocation of non-participants between those receiving 
benefits and those not receiving benefits. If these latter changes in allocation would take place it 
would, by the way, imply a direct form of rent seeking behaviour: it would suggest that if benefit 
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levels go up, more people seek eligibility for benefits without the intention to participate as active 
worker. 
 
Increased participation of women is equally distributed over workers in the market sector and 
non-participants receiving benefits. The parameter values of the allocation model are calculated in 
such a manner that they are, in the mean of the reference period, in accordance with the chosen 
values of the long term elasticities. The respective values are given in table A.1 of the Annex. 
 
After these parameter values were established, the constant terms of the allocation model (which 
should add up to 0.5 because of the distributed lag) and the values of the coefficients with respect to 
the social climate variable have been determined by means of regression analysis. We have valued 
social climate by means of proxy on an a priori basis (5 in 1969-1974, 4 in 1975-1981, 3 in 
1981-1982, 2 in 1983-1985 en 1 from 1986 onwards). When estimating the coefficient value of this 
variable, there appears to be a striking similarity between the values of the proxy and the trend of the 
residual of the allocation model (see figure 3). It appears that social climate mainly describes a 
reallocation between active workers and non-participants receiving a benefit. A low value of the 
proxy for social climate is associated with active workers moving to the part of the basin of 
non-participants receiving benefits. The influence on non-participants not receiving a benefit appears 
to be rather small. Therefore, we do not show the residual share of this category in figure 3. 
Obviously it does not make much difference for the simulation results when, as an alternative to the 
proxy for social climate, we would have followed the procedure of describing social climate by 
means of the trend value of the residual of the allocation model (see Den Butter, 1993b, for an 
elaboration of this procedure). 
 
Figure 3 Residual shares in the allocation model 
 
a. active workers    b. non-participants receiving benefits 
 
 residual share 
+ value of proxy 
 






given a plausible value. We have given γ the value of 0.5: a dynamic simulation over the reference 
period shows that the actual supply effect according to this coefficient value over the reference 
period has been 10% of national income, given the actual decrease of labour participation. We note 
that a sensitivity analysis, not presented in this paper, indicates that the simulation results are rather 
sensitive to the value of this coefficient γ, and, hence, of the extent in which an increase of labour 
participation induces more production. Moreover, the modelling of the participation effect depends 
upon the type of impulse: the effect of an autonomous increase in labour participation may differ 
from the second order effect of an autonomous increase in demand. Further research on this aspect 
is much desired. 
 
A dynamic simulation over the reference period shows that the model is quite capable to describe 
the past, given the selected parameter values. Moreover, a joint estimation of all parameters of the 
allocation model does not lead to a rejection from a statistical point of view of the parameter values 
selected by us. 
 
 
4. Scenario's for social security and labour participation 
 
This section gives the result of a number of simulations using the model. The main aim of these 
simulations is to investigate the working of the model in order to see how it can be used in model 
based policy analysis. Of cause our simulations also give an impression of possible developments in 
reality under different assumptions on policy options. However, as the model is highly aggregated 
and does not differentiate between the various regulations of social security, it is only in a general 
sense that we do refer to policy measures as 'price policies' or 'volume policies'. 
 
Firstly we present the results of two cliometric simulations. Such simulations show how economic 
development in the past would have looked like, if some events would have occurred that in fact did 
not occur (or if some events would not have occurred that in fact did occur). Table 2 shows how the 
Dutch economy would have developed from 1970 onwards, if the expenditures on social security 
(relative to real national income) had been constant. This simulation tries to visualise the idea 
politicians had on the future costs of social security at the start of the consolidation face of the system 
of social security at the beginning of 1970's. How would economic development have looked like if, 
at that time, not the benefit level, but the cost of social security had been hold constant? In order to 
simulate this budgeting of social security, we have respecified the model in such a manner that no 
longer expenditures on social security determine the wedge, but that, given the wedge, a fixed 
amount is available for social security expenditures. It implies that an increase in the number of 
persons eligible for benefits leads, c.p., to a reduction in the benefit level. The results of table 2 give 
the difference between the dynamic simulation of the past in which the value of the wedge is equal to 
its actual value (baseline projection) and a dynamic simulation (alternative projection) in which the 






Table 2 Indicators for the relative size of the public sector in the case of a wedge held constant at 
the level of 1970 (deviations from baseline projection) 
  
 
     1975  1980  1985  1990  
 
Economic activity       %  5.0   5.6    7.3  10.9 
  
Employment    %  10.3  11.4   15.0  22.9 
Government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income   %-p -5.9  -7.6  -7.9 -12.3 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of  
gross wage costs)   %-p -10.1 -12.9 -16.1 -24.6  
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector  %-p -19.1 -22.7 -30.9 -48.3 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons    %-p -11.5 -13.2 -17.7 -27.7  
 
Explanatory note:%percentage difference from baseline projection 
%-ppercentage-points difference from baseline projection 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the actual increase of the wedge and the induced discouragement to participate in 
the labour market has had a rather large negative effect on economic activity and employment. Our 
keynote figures with respect to the productive basis only display a minor increase in case of a 
constant wedge.  
 
Table 3 pictures the economic development when social climate would have remained at the level of 
1970. Although this cliometric simulation is governed by quite another mechanism than that of table 
2, the outcomes for the keynote figures show a striking similarity. If the demand for social security 
would have been as well restricted over the whole reference period as it was at the beginning of the 
1970's and, hence, if no 'rent seeking' on social security would have occurred, economic develop-
ment would have been much more favourable. This is mainly due to the difference in labour 
participation. This simulation with a constant social climate even yields somewhat more favourable 
effects on labour participation and economic activity than the previous simulation in which the 






Table 3Indicators for the relative size of the public sector in the case of a 'social climate' held 
constant at the level of 1970 (deviations from baseline projection) 
  
 
     1975  1980  1985  1990 
 
Economic activity   %  0.9   2.9   7.8  12.0 
Employment    %  1.8   5.8  16.1  25.5 
Government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income   %-p -1.0  -2.9  -6.3  -9.5 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of 
gross wage costs)   %-p -1.8  -5.3 -13.7 -20.8 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector   %-p -4.2 -13.0 -34.9 -54.8 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active  
persons    %-p -2.6  -7.6 -20.6 -32.1  
 
Explanatory note:see table 2. 
 
 
Our simulation model is not only built to repaint the past but also to picture a future in which social 
security is less burdensome than today. However, for model simulations there is no big gap between 
past and future. Whereas a cliometric simulation may show how things went wrong in the past, 
scenario analysis may reveal how these mistakes from the past can be corrected in future. Therefore, 
the following scenario's for the future constitute the mirror image of the cliometric simulations 
discussed above.  
 
Table 4 provides the keynote figures for the central projection over the future. As was mentioned 
before, this extrapolation is based on plausible future values of the exogenous variables of the model 
(when possible derived from the projections of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau) and is 
calculated using the simulation model. It appears that our central projection for the future does not 
contain much surprise: no major changes to come as compared to the present situation. Anyhow, 
according to our central projection the negative spiral of high costs of social security and a further 
discouragement with respect to labour participation does not continue. We note that such a 
projection is only effectuated because we have left the social climate proxy at its present value and do 






Table 4Indicators for the relative size of the public sector; extrapolation according to the 
distribution model (baseline projection for the future scenarios) 
  
 
    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  
 
Government expenditure as a percentage of 
national income   51.9 47.1  49.0  48.8  48.6 
Size of wedge (as a percentage of  
gross wage costs)   61.1 61.1  60.9  60.5  60.1 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage  
of earners in the private sector   144.7 145.1  145.0  144.5  143.8 
Inactive persons as a percentage of active 
persons    87.1  87.8  88.0  88.1  88.1  
 
 
Table 5Indicators for the relative size of the public sector; implications of a volume measure 
(deviations from baseline projection) 
  
 
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  
 
Economic activity  % 1.0   2.7    4.9   7.2   8.7 
Employment   % 2.0   5.6   10.0  14.8  18.1 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -1.0  -2.4   -4.3  -6.1  -7.1 
Size of wedge (as a percentage 
of gross wage costs)  %-p -2.2  -5.6   -9.7 -13.8 -16.2 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector %-p -6.0 -15.4  -25.8 -35.9 -41.5 
Inactive persons as a percentage 
of active persons %-p -3.5  -9.0 -15.2 -21.4 -24.9  
 
Explanatory note:%percentage difference from baseline projection 
%-ppercentage-points difference from baseline projection 
 
 
Table 5 gives the effects for the years to come of what we call volume policies. This simulation 
assumes that social climate will return to its value of 1970 (from 1 in 1991 to 5 in 1995 en 1996). 
The main results are completely in accordance with our intuition and we would not have needed a 
modelling exercise for it: such fast restraint on the eligibility for social security would most favourably 
affect labour participation, the productive basis and, hence, economic activity. Of course this 
scenario highly exaggerates what is (politically) conceivable in reality. Moreover, modelling volume 





implemented (see the next section). Yet, the simulation illustrates the importance of a policy directed 
at solving the moral hazard and rent seeking problems of social security. Present policy proposals in 
The Netherlands include a number of specific measures in order to achieve such a reduction in the 
demand for social security. We note that similar measures are part of the 'European Renaissance' 
scenario of the Central Planning Bureau (1992b). 
 
Table 6 pictures the future in case of an austere price policy. The upper part of the table gives the 
effects of a permanent 30 percent decrease in the benefit level, excluding that of old age pensioners 
(OAP). The lower part of table 6 shows the results in case old age pensioners undergo this reduction 
of 30 percent as well. The model illustrates that such  price policies also lead to an enhanced 
productive basis and hence to more economic activity. We note that the consequences of an austere 
price policy are also described by the 'Balanced Growth' scenario of the Central Planning Bureau 
(1992b)
5
. It is remarkable that the favourable development of our scenario is not much affected 
when the old age pensioners, who account for more than half of the number of persons receiving 
benefits, are included in the policy measure. The reason is that the reduction in old age pensions 
only indirectly, by way of the wedge, induces a higher labour participation, whereas according to the 
model a reduction in the benefit level of the other recipients of benefits enhances labour partici-
pation directly as well as through second order effects. In this case the supply effect induces a strong 
spiralling mechanism. 
 
As a final scenario for the future table 7 shows the effects of a reduction of the number of civil 
servants and workers in the semi-public sector. We assume an additional 2 % reduction each year 
from 1992 onwards (i.e. 2 % reduction in 1992, 4 % reduction in 1993 etc.). This policy of restraint 
implies that, as expected, the size of the public sector becomes smaller. On the other hand, not all 
superfluous public servants will find a job in the market sector. The net result according to the 
model is that this policy measure leads to a decrease of employment, so that the ratio of workers and 
non-participants receiving a benefit further increases. After a temporary decrease even the wedge 
comes out at a higher level at the end of the simulation period as compared to the central projection. 
This outcome of the model partly is the consequence of the assumption that civil servants and 
workers in the semi-public sector contribute to national income and that consequently, whenever 
they get dismissed and become unemployed the productive basis and economic activity decreases. 
This again leads to a fall of labour demand in the market sector. 
 
                                                 
     
5
  Although this scenario presumes a gradual introduction of a negative income tax 
(individualised tax credit), the size of the (marginal) wedge decreases considerably as compared to 





Table 6Indicators for the relative size of the public; implications of a price measure (deviations 




30% benefits cut excl. OAP 
 
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
 
Economic activity  %  2.0   3.3   4.3   4.8   5.2 
Employment   %  4.0   6.8   8.7   9.9  10.7 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -4.6  -5.4  -6.0  -6.3  -6.4 
Size of wedge (as a percentage 
of gross wage costs)  %-p -8.4 -10.6 -12.0 -12.9 -13.4 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage 
of earners in the private sector %-p -10.8 -17.3 -21.3 -23.5 -24.8 
Inactive persons as a percentage 
of active persons %-p  -6.1  -9.9 -12.2 -13.5 -14.3 
 
 
30% benefits cut incl. OAP 
 
    1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  
 
Economic activity  %  2.3   3.8   4.8   5.4   5.8 
Unemployment  %  4.6   7.7   9.8  11.1  11.9 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -6.9  -7.5  -8.1  -8.4  -8.5 
Size of wedge (as a percentage 
of gross wage costs)  %-p -12.1 -14.1 -15.6 -16.4 -16.9 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage  
of earners in the private sector %-p -12.1 -19.1 -23.3 -25.7 -26.9 
Inactive persons as a percentage 
of active persons %-p  -6.8 -10.9 -13.3 -14.7 -15.5  
 







Table 7Indicators for the relative size of the public sector; implications of a cut in the 




    1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  
 
Economic activity  % -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.5 
Employment   % -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -2.2 -2.9 
Government expenditure as a 
percentage of national income %-p -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 
Size of wedge (as a percentage  
of gross wage costs)  %-p -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0  0.1 
Earners in the public sector as a percentage  
of earners in the private sector  %-p -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 
Inactive persons as a percentage  
of active persons %-p  0.5  1.1  1.9  2.7  3.5  
 
Explanatory note:see table 5. 
 
 
5 Conclusion: social security and the welfare state 
 
This paper finds its inspiration in the observation that the generous and extended social security 
system in The Netherlands may have become an obstacle for welfare by decreasing labour participa-
tion and economic activity. The cliometric simulations of Section 4 clearly indicate that the rise in 
the wedge and the increase in eligibility for social security benefits (reflected by the decay of social 
climate) have significantly contributed to the reduction in the productive basis in The Netherlands 
during the last decades. 
 
This is, however, only one side of the picture. An extension of social security may also enhance 
welfare by offering protection against financial risks to more people and by increasing equality. One 
can speak about a trade-off in social security between efficiency on the one hand and income 
redistribution and risk reduction on the other. Vijlbrief (1992) has empirically illustrated this 
trade-off by 'output possibilities curves', which show a negative relation between the (relative) benefit 
level and output.  
 
Yet, the current level of social security in The Netherlands is most probably not in accordance with 
policy preferences and there is a broad consensus that the demand for social security should be 
reduced. Dutch policy plans to reduce this demand for social security diverge with regard to the 
instruments to be used. Some proposals imply price policies, i.e., a reduction of the benefit level, 
whereas others recommend volume policies, which seek to decrease the number of people eligible 
for benefits directly. The simulation results of tables 5 and 6 indicate that both policies can be 
effective in increasing economic activity and labour participation. As volume policies do not imply a 





However, we should take a closer look at an important example of volume policies, active labour 
market policies. 
 
Active labour market policies, which provide training and job programmes for the unemployed 
combined with more pressure to search for and accept jobs, make it easier to monitor the behaviour 
of the unemployed and to control for moral hazard. Moreover, these policies will increase effective 
labour supply by preventing long-term unemployment. The favourable effects of active labour 
market policies can be strengthened by a reform of the administrative authorities of social security in 
The Netherlands. Until now, the tasks of paying benefits and helping people to find a (new) job are 
separated in The Netherlands. A closer co-operation or even an integration of these authorities may 
enforce the monitoring of job search by the unemployed
6
. The most important disadvantage of 
active labour market policies is that they involve a risk with regard to government expenditures. 
Especially job creation (for instance through wage subsidies) may endanger the reduction in the 
wedge and, consequently, the rise in labour participation. 
 
There are, however, some other policies which may bring down the number of benefit recipients in 
The Netherlands, without reducing the level of benefits. A sharper decline in the time profile of 
benefits gives an additional incentive to search and accept a job. A major drawback of such a policy 
is that the inequality among the unemployed will increase, and that, in the case of uncertain 
unemployment durations, the financial risk will rise. Finally, experience rating, relating social security 
premiums to the unemployment and disability records of an industry, may enhance the efficiency of 
social security and reduce the number of benefit recipients. 
 
The Dutch welfare state is endangered by the effects of social security on labour participation and 
economic activity. There are two negative spirals, which have led to a steady increase in the costs of 
social security, and to a fall in the productive basis for social security. Our simulation model offers a 
first step for a quantitative analysis of the linkages between the demand for social security, labour 
participation and economic activity in The Netherlands. The scenarios for the future indicate that 
the negative spirals can be reversed, either by a reduction in social security benefits or by bringing the 
social climate back to its 1970 level. The reconstruction of the Dutch welfare state implies a choice 
between creating a less generous social security system through price policies or making social 
security more affordable by means of volume policies. Although the latter policies may take some 
time to become effective and involve a risk with regard to a quick reduction in the costs of social 
security in The Netherlands, they are worth trying before harsher policies are applied. 
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 For similar, more elaborated policy plans to enhance the 'social climate' we refer to Van Praag 





























Bb' = Bb - Bo - Bsc (3) 
 
Bm/Bb' = 0.5 (Bm/Bb')
-1
 + β0m +  β1mAv  + β2mlb' +  β3mweda' +  β4muv  +   




 + β0ui +  β1uiAv + β2uilb' + β3uiweda'+  β4uiuv +  




 + β0zu +  β1zuAv + β2zulb' + β3zuweda'+  β4zuuv +  
  β5zusc + β6zuvr (6) 
 
with parameter restrictions 
 
β0x = 0.5,  x = m, ui, zu 
 




Av = {(y/ap) (1 + 0.5(100-h))} / Bb' (7) 
 
lb' = lb/(ap/ap1969) (8) 
 
ln = lb (1 - wed)   (9) 
 
luin = luib weda' (10) 
 











gui = lui Bui (13) 
 
gaow = laow Baow (14) 
 
opov = τy (15) 
 
opbp = gsal + gui + gaow + gaut - opov - opaut - fto (16) 
 
wed = opbp / {lb Bm + lo (Bo + Bsc)} (17) 
 
weda = [ta / (ta + tq)] wed (18) 
 
weda' = (1 - weda) (19) 
 
 
Effect of labour participation at the goods market 
 
 




with part = (Bm + Bo + Bsc) / Bb (21) 
 





Table A.1 gives the parameter values of the allocation model which correspond to the selected 
values of the long term elasticities reported in the main text. In case linkage equations are included 







Table A.1Parameter values of the allocation model  
 
  β  m  ui  zu 
 
  1 (Av)  0.41 -0.10 -0.31   
  2 (lb')  -4.0 10
-6
  1.0 10
-6
  3.1 10
-6
 
  3 (weda')  0.065 -0.016 -0.050  
  4 (uv) -5.0 10
-4
  5.0 10
-4
  0 
  5 (sc)  0.0064 -0.0072  0.0008   
  6 (vr)  0.0013  0.0013 -0.0025                       
 





apTrend of labour productivity (exogenous) 
AvDeterminants of labour demand which are relevant to the allocation model (excluding labour 
costs) 
BaowNumber of persons eligible for basic old age and widows and orphans pensions 
BbWorking age population (aged 15-65) 
BjPopulation under 15 
BmNumber of workers in the market sector 
BoNumber of workers in public sector (civil servants) and in social security offices 
BovRemainder of working age non-participants eligible for benefits 
BscNumber of workers in semi-public sector 
BvutNumber of persons eligible for an early retirement benefit 
BuNumber of unemployed with an unemployment benefit 
BuiTotal number of working age non-participants eligible for benefits 
BwaoNumber of persons eligible for benefits under the Work Disablement Act (WAO) 
BzNumber of persons receiving benefits because of temporary illness 
BzuNumber of working age non-participants not eligible for social security benefits 
fto Financial deficit of the government (constant prices) 
gaowGovernment expenditure on basic old age and widows and orphans pensions (constant prices) 
gautOther (autonomous) government expenditure (constant prices) 
gsalSalaries of civil servants and workers in semi-public sector (constant prices) 
guiTotal government expenditure on benefits for working age non-participants (constant prices) 
hIndex contractual labour time 
laowBenefit level for basic old age and widows and orphans pensions 
lbGross real labour costs per worker in the market sector 
lb'Idem corrected for labour productivity 
lnNet real wages in the market sector 
loLevel of salaries of civil servants and workers in the semi-public sector at constant prices 
luibAverage level of gross benefits to the working age population at constant prices 





opautOther government income (constant prices) 
opbpGovernment income from wage and income taxes, and from social security premiums (constant 
prices) 
opovGovernment income from other taxes (constant prices) 
partLabour participation rate 
partgemAverage labour participation rate over the reference period 
scProxy for so called 'social climate' i.e. the instrument for reducing the number of working age 
non-participants eligible for social security benefits 
ta/(ta+tq) Share of workers' tax and premium burden in total wedge 
uvReplacement ratio 
vrTrend of female participation rate 
wedWedge between gross wage costs and net wages 
wedaTax and premium burden for workers 
yNational income (constant prices) 
yexIdem, at average participation rate (determined exogenously)  
π1Ratio of pupulation under 15 which obtains working age 
π2Ratio of working age population of those who leave the working age population (by deceases, net 
emigration) 
π3Ratio of working age population of those who become eligible for an old age or widow's pension 
π4Ratio of number of persons eligible for an old age or widow's pension and of the number of 
persons leaving this category (by deceases, net emigration, remarrying) 
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